Showing posts with label Alienation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Alienation. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 9, 2020

Review of Scott Horton's Fool's Errand from the December Greater Sturbridge Town & Country Living Magazine.

Was This Trip Necessary?


Fool's Errand: Time to End the War in Afghanistan 

By Scott Horton

The Libertarian Institute, 2017


By Richard Morchoe 


Scott Horton, author of Fool's Errand: Time to End the War in Afghanistan, begins the last section of the book thus: "The occupation of Afghanistan is not just America's longest foreign war.  It may also have the distinction of being both the least supported and least opposed war in our history."  Nineteen years on, it is a zombie conflict with its think tank and military supporters coming up with little rhyme or reason to be there other than to be there.


The people may not be following all that closely, but there is a constituency doing well, the suppliers of the war material are passionately supporting our sojourn over there.


Horton's Fool's Errand could be assigned as the text of a college survey course on our involvement even before the events of 911.  The book is exhaustively documented and foot noted.  Mr. Horton is director of the Libertarian Institute as well as editorial director of Antiwar.com.  He hosts Antiwar Radio Pacifica, 90.7 FM KPFK in Los Angeles, California, and also a podcast, the Scott Horton Show from Scott Horton.org.


As he is associated with Antiwar.com, it would not be difficult to observe that he probably looks at our Afghan involvement with a critical eye, if the title, Fool's Errand did not give it away.


Full disclosure, your reviewer has contributed content to Antiwar.com and has a slight acquaintance with Mr. Horton.


It is not easy to make sense of the long engagement in Afghanistan, maybe because it can't make sense.  A cliché analogy would be it is a hall of mirrors and that is as good as any.  We have lurched from one bad decision to another.


It goes without saying that the events of 911 did not just happen out of the blue.  George Bush's comment about hating our freedom does not hold up, as a read of Scott's book would demonstrate.  The lack of reason is accentuated when the rationale that we have to "Fight them over there so we don't have to fight them over here" is used.  Even when an attack happens in the "homeland” (e.g. the Boston Marathon Bombing) the answer does not change.


So, what did cause certain denizens of the Islamic east to carry out the attack on the Twin Towers and set off almost two decades of war?


Scott Horton cites University of Chicago professor Robert Pape who undertook a study of Islam to figure out the cause of suicide terrorism.  He was shocked when he found out that it was not religion that led to the attacks, but reaction to foreign occupation.


People of other faiths would also resort to self-destruction as part of their resistance.  Not so long ago, the Tamils, who are not Muslims, fought a long war of liberation against the Sri Lankan state and would use the tactic.


Pape and his grad students built a database "of every suicide attacker on earth since 1980."  The findings; these are not losers who have given up on life.  "The single most significant factor in determining whether someone would commit an act of suicide terrorism was the presence of foreign combat forces on the attacker’s territory."


It would have been a good idea to think about how Arabs and Muslims might react to our troops on Saudi soil or the first war against Iraq.  Nah, just go with hate us for our freedom as motive.


Anyway, no matter the motive, the attack of 911 was, murder most foul.  The United States had every reason to demand the extradition of the perpetrators and if refused, take military action to apprehend them.


But, as Scott writes, there was a fly in that ointment.


The Taliban were, and one must assume, still are, serious about their religion.  They were, however, not in love with al Qaeda.  Three months before 911, Mullah Omar gave an interview to a western journalist in which he expressed his displeasure with bin Laden.


Granted, the Taliban refused to just hand over their guest, but they knew the man was a hot potato and they needed at least a fig leaf of accommodation to drop him.  They offered to turn bin Laden over to a third country.  We wanted him and that was that.


Were the Taliban just stalling?  Horton looks at the words of Milton Bearden who had been the CIA station chief running the covert war in the 1980s, "We never heard what they were trying to say.  We had no common language.  Ours was, 'Give up bin Laden.'  They were saying, 'Do something to help us give him up'..."  


That the Taliban was trying to dance away from bin Laden never made the news at the time.  Even if they were being cute, it is undeniable that the Bush administration would settle for nothing but absolute compliance.  


We could not take yes for an answer.


Horton goes into much detail, but suffice it to say in the words of Lincoln, "and the war came."


Even after the war started and, supposedly, finished, elements of the Taliban were trying to come to terms with the new regime and were rebuffed.  It should not have been a surprise when later on they would go back to war.


We were "nation building," but it did not seem to be going well.  Our lack of popularity among those we were uplifting was noted by journalist Chris Sands.  The insurgency may not have been an honorable enterprise, but Sands observed, "when civilians are killed by the Taliban in Kandahar, locals still blame the [U.S.-supported] government instead of the Taliban, who are "rarely the subject of the people's fury" in such circumstances."


The project seemed to be meandering such that Karzai, the president, was referred to as the Mayor of Kabul as the writ of the government did not seem to exceed the boundary of the capital.


What to do?  How about a surge, i.e. more troops?


This one would be different from the Iraq endeavor.  It would be baked in a think tank oven by "COINdistas."  COIN refers to Counter Insurgency warfare and it had its stars.


There were old neocon retreads as a supporting cast, but new faces were not wanting such as the Aussie COIN theorist, David Kilcullen.  General James Mattis, who would later become known for a role in the Trump administration, wrote the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, but the guy who really made his brand, such as it is, was General David Petraeus.


Petraeus was the man with a plan.  He and his confreres "promised Obama that with the plan they could have the Taliban sitting at the table, ready to concede to American terms within 18 months–by July 2011."  


That that did not happen was hardly an impediment to Petraeus.  He always claimed his escalation was working, with constant gains, albeit "fragile" and "reversible," which means not actual gains.


No matter that the resistance continued to grow, Dave's rep grew as well, until he and his amanuensis and mistress, Paula Broadwell, were caught sharing classified material.  He was slapped on the wrist with a misdemeanor conviction that might have been a felony for someone else.  Petraeus has not slunk away in disgrace, but is doing well.  You've heard of the term, "empty suit."  This guy was an empty uniform.


What is the point of it all?  Maybe there are riches beneath the soil, but the U.S., and certainly its people will not profit from them.  The Afghans will continue to extract wealth from the land in the form of opium, but your average Afghani will not become rich.


The Greek historian Herodotus related how the Spartan king, Pausanias, after the battle of Platea, contrasted the luxury of the captured Persian king's table as set for dinner and his own poor "spartan" supper.  Pausanias commented that the Persians had "come to rob us of our poverty."


Taliban members must think us that stupid.


History does not stop so, I reached out to Scott as to where we stand now.  He was kind enough to respond:


"Despite the fact that Donald Trump did not believe in the war in Afghanistan, in 2017, he sent more troops, and massively increased airstrikes, killing tens of thousands of people. He did so while at the same time successfully negotiating a withdrawal deal with the Taliban. The terms are that the U.S. will withdraw all combat forces by May 2021, as long as the Taliban agree not to allow international terrorists on their territory.


Joe Biden opposes this deal. He still wants to implement his plan from the Obama years: a garrison of thousands of "counter-terrorism" forces stationed there indefinitely.


Biden may or may not seek regime change against any more secular governments, but he certainly plans on continuing the "war on terrorism," which means war against troublesome radicals anywhere the U.S. military and CIA drone forces can find them from Nigeria to the Philippines.


In the seemingly unlikely chance that Trump is declared the winner of the election after-all, there will still be enormous pressure on him to cancel the deal and stay under the pretext of al Qaeda's return or the dangers of Afghan "ISIS."


Either way, the American people are going to have to insist that the deal is seen through and the U.S.'s role in that tragic war, and the rest of the terror wars, is finally brought to an end."












Sunday, November 6, 2016

War is hell, then you come home-Review of Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging by Sebastian Junger

My review from the July, 2016 Sturbridge Times Magazine.

You may have heard the statistic that 22 veterans kill themselves a day.  From that stat, one may get the idea of a national crisis and the depth of the problem, or maybe not.  It turns out that the majority of that number are Vietnam vets.  As a qualifier, that changes the discussion from an immediate problem for recent servicemen and women to something that could have other reasons.

Still, a number around ten is a problem here and now.  Is anyone noticing?  Sebastian Junger is.  Junger is a well known author of many books on various subjects from his most famous The Perfect Storm, to modern warfare and other subjects.  He has been embedded many times with military forces and is a man of adventure.  His personal encounter with horror led him to publish Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging.

Junger found himself not immune to the stress of life following a stint as a combat reporter.  Almost a year before 911, he suffered a panic attack in the New York Subway.  Junger had been in Afghanistan covering battle between the Taliban, of whom you have heard of by now, and the Northern Alliance of Ahmad Shah Massoud.  It was a a brutal war well before we became involved.

Yet here back home, in maybe not the world's most pleasant venue, but still not a war zone, he fell apart.  Sebastian has been thinking about it, to say the least.  As bad as the momentary event was, he recovered.  Junger had had Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or PTSD, which is in the news lately so you might have heard about it.  His occurrence was short-term (acute) and he had several over time and then they stopped.

The author did not know what it was and did not connect it to his time in a combat environment.  It was in a conversation with a psychotherapist at a picnic that he realized what had happened.

PTSD is part of the evolutionary tool kit.  Heightened awareness in an emergency situation is just what one needs.  On the subway, though, it might not be as helpful.

The author also found out a lot facts about combat and PTSD.  Some of them are surprising.  Only about 20% suffer it long term and chronically.  Something else he discovered, American troops take a third as many casualties as in Vietnam, but now claim three times the number of disabilities.  He has other stats about the problem, but also many insights.

If you go through battle and end up with the chronic form of the disorder, you probably had problems before combat.  In fact, combatants are no more likely than vets who have not been under fire to kill themselves.  So what is it all about?  Why would we go to pieces after coming home?

Junger explores a “civilization and its discontents theme.”  We who live in a so-called civilized society would seem to have it better than the “savages.”  Not all felt the same.

The author cites the writings of Ben Franklin on the subject.  According to Dr. Franklin, as quoted by Junger, “”White captives who were liberated from the Indians were almost impossible to keep at home : “Tho' ransomed by their friends, and treated with all imaginable tenderness to prevail with them to stay among the English, yet in a short time they become disgusted with our manner of life...and take the first good opportunity of escaping again into the woods.””

In case you are wondering, the operative word here is the  title of the book.  The aboriginal inhabitants of the continent lived in tribes and Junger wants to make a point.  Men in wars live and fight with comrades in cohesive groups, depending on each other for survival.  He does not call them tribes exactly in that situation, but why not?

They come home to “Thank you for your service” and some rah rah stuff, but little else.  That unit esprit is gone and they are on their own.  Many lose it.  Junger has seen it elsewhere.  The Siege of Sarajevo saw solidarity amongst the besieged.  That camaraderie evaporated with peace and is mourned.

The author cites Israel as a place with little diagnosed PTSD.  That most of that nation are at some time in the army and have a greater fellow feeling has something to do with it.  Men and women are both subject to service.  Somehow it does not seem that universal conscription is going to happen here.

That would be a solution to PTSD in the military.  After all, if all the kids of the rich and powerful and the politicians were drafted and had to learn to low crawl through the mud with the sons and daughters of trailer park denizens, our wars would end before Ivanka or Chelsea lost a nail.